Summary of Holcomb v. Georgia Pacific, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 56` by Meyer, Miriam C.
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries Law Journals
12-6-2012
Summary of Holcomb v. Georgia Pacific, 128 Nev.
Adv. Op. 56`
Miriam C. Meyer
Nevada Law Journal
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Torts Commons
This Case Summary is brought to you by Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law
Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Meyer, Miriam C., "Summary of Holcomb v. Georgia Pacific, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 56`" (2012). Nevada Supreme Court Summaries. Paper
142.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/142
Holcomb v. Georgia Pac., L.L.C., 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 56 (Dec. 6, 2012)
1
 
 
TORTS ACTION – CAUSATION STANDARD IN ASBESTOS-INDUCED 
MESOTHELIOMA 
 
Summary 
 
 An appeal from a district court’s grant of summary judgment for manufacturers of 
asbestos-containing products. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
The Court adopted the test set forth in Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp.,
2
 as used in 
cases where a plaintiff’s mesothelioma is alleged to have been caused by exposure to products 
containing asbestos. Under the Lohrmann test, a plaintiff must prove exposure to the defendant’s 
product “on a regular basis over some extended period of time” and “in proximity to where the 
plaintiff actually worked” to warrant a reasonable inference that the exposure caused the 
mesothelioma.  
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Randy Holcomb (Holcomb) and his wife, appellant Tamara Holcomb, filed a complaint 
against manufacturers of asbestos-containing products, Kelly-Moore, Kaiser Gypsum, and 
Georgia Pacific, and against Union Carbide, a seller and supplier and of asbestos to these 
manufacturers, based on Holcomb’s contraction of mesothelioma. They alleged that the 
mesothelioma was caused by exposure to asbestos contained in those parties’ products, which 
Holcomb used for several years while working as a construction laborer. Before his death, 
Holcomb testified that he used the manufacturing brands’ products on a regular occasion over 
several years. According to Holcomb, using these products created multiple occurrences of 
dusty, asbestos-laden conditions at each job site. The appellants presented causation evidence 
from a pathologist concluding that Holcomb’s mesothelioma was attributable to asbestos. 
Holcomb did not remember using any particular product on any particular job or at any particular 
time. However, Holcomb had specific memories of using all of the named product brands on a 
regular basis. A second expert opinion explained that Holcomb’s mesothelioma was caused by 
exposure to asbestos in the manufacturers’ joint-compound and in other manufacturers’ 
automotive-friction products. 
 
As relevant to this appeal, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, 
concluding there was insufficient evidence of exposure to allow a jury to find that the 
defendants’ products were substantial factors in causing Holcomb’s mesothelioma. 
 
 
                                                          
1
  By Miriam C. Meyer 
2
 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986). 
Discussion 
 
 Chief Justice Cherry wrote the unanimous opinion for the Court sitting en banc. The 
Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.3 The appellants argued that 
the district court erred in granting summary judgment because appellants’ expert opined that 
even low exposures are sufficient to cause mesothelioma. Appellants further contend that they 
established a threshold amount of exposure by asserting that Holcomb was exposed to asbestos 
in respondents’ products, and they therefore presented a triable issue of material fact. 
Respondents contend that summary judgment was proper because appellants were not able to 
demonstrate a minimum level of exposure to asbestos in any particular product. 
 
The Causation Standard in Asbestos-Induced Mesothelioma Cases 
 
Regardless of the cause of action, medical causation and causation through sufficient 
exposure are necessary elements in proving appellants’ case.4 While medical causation is not at 
issue, the Court mandated appellants to demonstrate that a particular defendant sufficiently 
exposed Holcomb to asbestos in order to establish adequate causation to hold that defendant 
liable. To balance the interests of deserving plaintiffs, who are typically unable to prove details 
of how much exposure they received from any particular defendant’s products, with the interests 
of non-responsible defendants, courts use different causation standards.
5
 The Court considered 
the causation standards used in three preeminent asbestos litigation cases, first, the “exposure-to-
risk” test of Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.;6 second, the “defendant-specific-dosage-plus- 
substantial-factor” test in Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores;7 and, third, the “frequency, regularity, 
proximity” test set forth in Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp.8  
 
Under the Rutherford test, plaintiffs may prove causation in asbestos-related cancer cases 
by showing that exposure to the defendant’s product in reasonable medical probability was a 
substantial factor in contributing to the aggregate dose of asbestos the plaintiff inhaled, and thus 
to the risk of developing asbestos-related cancer.
9
 The Court rejected this test because it treats 
every non-negligible exposure to risk as a factual cause and therefore does not afford enough 
protection to non-responsible defendants.
10
 
 
Under the Flores test, the Texas Supreme Court relied on Rutherford, but required 
plaintiffs to present not only evidence of regular exposure but also specific evidence relating to 
the approximate dose of each defendant’s product to which the plaintiff was exposed, and 
evidence that the dose was a substantial factor in causing the asbestos-related disease.
11
 The 
Court rejected this test because it severely burdens a plaintiff to prove these particularities of 
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exposure. 
 
The Court followed the majority of federal courts and adopted the Lohrmann “frequency, 
regularity, proximity” test, as applied in mesothelioma cases,12 to determine whether a 
defendant’s product was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs mesothelioma.13 The focus 
of this test is to reduce the evidentiary burden on plaintiffs while still absolving defendants who 
were not responsible for plaintiffs’ injuries.14 When a plaintiff alleges multiple sources of 
exposure to asbestos, the plaintiff must prove exposure to a “specific product” attributable to the 
defendant, “on a regular basis over some extended period of time” and “in proximity to where 
the plaintiff actually worked,” such that it is more than a casual contact and probable, or 
reasonable to infer, that the exposure to the defendant’s products caused plaintiffs injuries.15 At 
the summary judgment stage, under this test, courts must assess whether considering the 
evidence concerning frequency, regularity, and proximity of a plaintiff’s exposure, a jury would 
be entitled to make the necessary inference of a sufficient causal connection between the 
defendant’s product and the asserted injury.16 
 
Sufficiency of the Evidence Relating to Holcomb’s Mesothelioma 
  
In this case, because there is more than one manufacturer of asbestos-containing 
products, appellants were required to prove that exposure to the products made or sold by that 
particular defendant was a substantial factor in causing the injury.
17
 Although every exposure to 
asbestos contributes to mesothelioma and even brief exposure can cause mesothelioma, 
appellants had to show more than any exposure.
18
 
  
Appellants argued that Holcomb’s testimony demonstrated triable issues of fact that he 
inhaled dust from the products manufactured by respondents and that this exposure was more 
than minimal because Holcomb recalled specify job sites, purchased the products, or 
remembered logos and lettering. Respondents asserted that Holcomb’s testimony was too 
generalized to demonstrate a reasonable inference that those products caused his mesothelioma 
because Holcomb could not recall details on the products’ labels, packaging, or markings and 
could not recall how often he used any particular product. 
  
The Court rejected the respondents’ arguments because Holcomb’s testimony and other 
evidence provide the basis for a reasonable inference that Holcomb’s mesothelioma was caused 
by exposure to each of the respondents’ products. Holcomb testified that he used the Kelly-
Moore, Kaiser Gypsum, and Georgia Pacific products, there was evidence that all products 
contained asbestos during the years when Holcomb used them, and respondents did not provide 
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evidence that the product was not available in Holcomb’s location. Holcomb asserted direct 
exposure to asbestos contained in the products, and Holcomb’s use of the products may amount 
to regular and proximate exposure over an extended period sufficient to cause mesothelioma. 
While Holcomb could not identify the particular packaging, logos, or names of some of the 
products, and he could not identify specific locations and jobs on which he used the products 40 
years ago, that level of identification is not required. Therefore, Holcomb met the burden to show 
an inference of probable exposure to the defendants’ asbestos products and a jury could 
reasonably infer that the products were a substantial factor in the development of Holcomb’s 
mesothelioma.
19
 
 
The Court affirmed summary judgment as to Union Carbide albeit on different grounds. 
The manufacturing companies used numerous suppliers of asbestos and without knowing the 
specific products that Holcomb used at a time, appellants could not show that Union Carbide’s 
asbestos was in the products used. Appellants further failed to provide other admissible 
evidence.
20
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Based on the adoption and application of the Lohrmann test, the Court concluded that 
appellants raised inferences of probable exposure to Kelly-Moore, Kaiser Gypsum, and Georgia 
Pacific’s products sufficient to defeat summary judgment as to those respondents, but not as to 
Union Carbide. 
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